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Abstract 
There are two main loci of contemporary debate about the nature of 
Madhyamaka ethics. The first investigates the general issue of wheth-
er the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness (śūnyavāda) is consistent 
with a commitment to systematic ethical distinctions. The second 
queries whether the metaphysical analysis of no-self presented by 
Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra entails the impartial benevolence of 
a bodhisattva. This article will critically examine these debates and 
demonstrate the ways in which they are shaped by competing under-
standings of Madhyamaka conventional truth or reality (saṃvṛtisatya) 
and the forms of reasoning admissible for differentiating conventional 
truth from falsity and good from bad.   
                                               
 
1 School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National Univer-
sity. Email: bronwyn.finnigan@anu.edu.au. 
2 Many thanks to Sara McClintock, Tom Tillemans and the editors of this collection for 
helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. I am also grateful for feedback from 
participants of the Australasian Workshop in Moral Philosophy (2016). 
2 Finnigan, Madhyamaka Ethics 
 
Introduction 
Madhyamaka is one of two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, alongside Yogācāra. It is best known for its philosophy of 
emptiness (śūnyavāda) as articulated by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadh-
yamakakārikā and has an illustrious lineage of eminent exponents in In-
dia, Tibet and China. While Mādhyamikas are primarily concerned with 
metaphysical and semantic issues, central figures also address ethical 
matters. Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA), in particular, provides the 
most extensive treatment of ethics within the Madhyamaka tradition. So 
influential is this text that the current Dalai Lama represents it as the 
epitome of Buddhist ethical thought.3 
There is a growing body of philosophical literature focused on 
critically examining how the Madhyamaka analysis of emptiness 
(śūnyatā) bears on the ethical claims and commitments that were held 
and asserted by historical Mādhyamikas. There are two main loci of con-
temporary debate. The first concerns the general issue of whether 
Madhyamaka emptiness is consistent with a commitment to systematic 
ethical distinctions. The second queries whether the metaphysical analy-
sis of no-self (anātman) presented by Śāntideva in BCA entails or pro-
vides good reasons for the compassion or altruism of a bodhisattva. This 
second issue was galvanized by Paul Williams (1998) who powerfully ar-
gued that these ontological considerations not only fail to provide a ra-
tional basis for altruism but that Śāntideva’s argument for this claim, if 
followed to its logical conclusion, actually undermined the bodhisattva 
path. Given the importance placed on this text within the Buddhist tra-
dition, Williams’ argument has unsurprisingly provoked a growing body 
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of literature aimed at rationally reconstructing a positive account of 
Śāntideva’s views and, thereby, a positive account of the relationship 
between a Madhyamaka metaphysical analysis and the Mahāyāna bodhi-
sattva ideal of acting out of great compassion for the suffering of all sen-
tient beings.  
While many aim to rationally reconstruct Madhyamaka ethics in 
positive terms, there is considerable disagreement about what this 
should be. This article will critically examine this literature and will 
demonstrate that much disagreement turns on competing interpreta-
tions of the doctrine of the two truths from the perspective of Madh-
yamaka: in particular, competing accounts of conventional truth or real-
ity (saṃvṛtisatya) as well as the forms of reasoning admissible for differ-
entiating conventional truth from falsity and conventional good from 
bad. To draw this out, this article will begin by providing a general in-
troduction to Madhyamaka śūnyavāda and outlining a range of positions 
on the nature of conventional reality that have been advanced and dis-
puted by historical Madhyamaka thinkers in India and Tibet. It will then 
use these different conceptions to navigate the above two loci of con-
temporary debate.  
 
Preliminary Background 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is the foundational text of 
Madhyamaka.4 It seeks to establish that all things are empty (śūnya) of 
an essence or intrinsic nature (svabhāva).  
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The notion of svabhāva is rooted in early Buddhist attempts to 
explain the Buddha’s doctrine of no-self (anātman). Abhidharma litera-
ture (the earliest scholastic literature of Indian Buddhism) proposed a 
two-tier mereological ontology whereby conceptually constructed 
wholes (universals, genera, kinds and types) were considered to be re-
ducible to ontologically simple, impartite entities (called dharmas). The 
reducible level was designated ‘conventional reality’ (saṃvṛtisat) as enti-
ties at this level are considered to be constructed, in part, in dependence 
on social and linguistic conventions. The reduced level was designated 
‘ultimate reality’ (paramārthasat) and was considered to have mind-
independent reality. To the extent that persons are complexes that are 
analysable into more primitive (psycho-physical) elements, they are 
conventionally but not ultimately real. It is also now commonplace to 
attribute to Ābhidharmikas the semantic principle that truth is a matter 
of what exists.5 More specifically, a conventional truth is (a statement 
about) what conventionally exists and an ultimate truth is (a statement 
about) what ultimately exists; i.e., simple, impartite entities. Thus, while 
it may be conventionally true that a person exists at a certain time and 
location, this (statement) is ultimately false.  
 For this metaphysical and semantic analysis to be plausible, some 
criterion is needed to differentiate the reducible and the reduced levels 
of analysis. According to Ābhidharmikas, the criterion of ultimate reality 
is possession of an essence or svabhāva. There is some controversy about 
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precisely how this notion is to be understood.6 It would seem that, on 
Nāgārjuna’s understanding, to say that an object has svabhāva is to say 
that it has an essential property which is intrinsic to the object and that 
accounts for its independent existence. This essential property thus se-
cures the numerical identity of the object and accounts for a genuine 
plurality of ultimately real entities.7 This essential property is also 
thought to withstand analysis in the sense of neither being further re-
ducible (it is the bedrock of analysis) nor dissolving into contradictions 
under analysis.8  
 In MMK, Nāgārjuna provides a series of reductio (prasaṅga) ar-
guments aimed at showing that this notion of svabhāva is inconsistent 
with another central Buddhist teaching, the doctrine of dependent orig-
ination (pratītyasamutpāda). Nāgārjuna argues that it is not possible, on 
pain of contradiction, for an object to both possess svabhāva and causal-
ly depend on other things for its existence. Since everything that exists 
is dependently originated, it follows that everything must be empty of 
svabhāva (MMK 24.19). If possessing svabhāva is the criterion of ultimate 
reality, it also follows that nothing ultimately exists. Moreover, if ulti-
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mate truth is (grounded in or corresponds to or is about) ultimate reali-
ty, it then follows that there is no ultimate truth. These entailments raise 
difficult questions. Do they imply, for instance, that nothing exists at all? 
What would secure the truth of these claims given that they seem to be 
statements about ultimate reality and thus of ultimate truth?9 Moreover, 
does this not remove the semantic underpinnings for the truth of the 
Buddha’s teachings? Nāgārjuna insists that the key to avoiding these 
problematic implications lies in a proper understanding of the distinc-
tion between conventional and ultimate truth (MMK 24.8).  
How best to understand Nāgārjuna’s views on these two truths is 
enormously controversial and has been the subject matter of considera-
ble commentarial dispute in India and Tibet. At least one interpretive 
issue bears on contemporary debates about the nature of Madhyamaka 
ethics. The issue concerns whether Nāgārjuna’s reasoning does or does 
not establish a positive thesis as the result of a valid argument. The view 
that it does, defended by Bhāvaviveka, has come to be known as ‘Svātan-
trika Madhyamaka’ and the view that it does not, defended by Candrakīr-
ti, is known as ‘Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka’.10 Later Tibetan Mādhyamika 
commentators bitterly divide over how this distinction is best under-
stood.11 While some consider it to be insubstantial, reflecting a mere dif-
                                               
 
9 Siderits (1989) galvanizes this issue by articulating this implication as the paradoxical 
claim: ‘The ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth’. While this claim is never 
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ference in rhetorical style,12 others maintain that it has substantive phil-
osophical import. Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), for instance, influentially 
argues that the distinction turns on different accounts of the nature of 
conventional truth.13  
 While contemporary debates about Madhyamaka ethics all refer 
to the notion of conventional truth, here also there are subtle differ-
ences in what this is taken to mean. As a result, it is not always obvious 
whether a disagreement is substantive or an equivocation in assumed 
accounts. To help navigate this terrain, I will individuate three distinct 
philosophical positions on the nature of conventional truth and the pos-
sibilities of its rational and epistemic analysis that have been attributed 
to Madhyamaka thinkers. In particular, I will follow Tom Tillemans 
(2016) in distinguishing two distinct philosophical positions that have 
been attributed to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka and which he respectively 
labels ‘typical Prāsaṅgika’ and ‘atypical Prāsaṅgika’. I will contrast these 
positions to that of Svātantrika Madhyamaka, which I will interpret in 
the sense ascribed to Bhāvaviveka by Tsongkhapa. It is not my intention 
to establish that these philosophical positions are the best deservers for 
the labels Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika nor establish that they accurately 
reflect the viewpoint of any particular historical Mādhyamika thinker. 
My aim is simply to highlight a spectrum of philosophical positions on 
the nature of conventional truth and demonstrate how they respectively 
inform current debates about Madhyamaka ethics. 
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At one end of the spectrum lies what Tillemans calls the ‘typical 
Prāsaṅgika’, which, in his view, is the ‘common, traditional Indian and 
Tibetan interpretation of Candrakīrti’ (2016: 5). According to this view, it 
is impossible for Mādhyamikas to accept a positive thesis about ultimate 
reality as the result of a valid argument because this would presuppose 
the semantic underpinning which MMK has shown to be internally in-
consistent.14 Mādhyamikas are thus methodologically constrained to us-
ing reductio arguments against their opponent’s theses but without hav-
ing a thesis of their own.15 Significantly, this is not thought to foreclose 
holding views about conventional reality. Nevertheless, it does methodo-
logically constrain the typical Prāsaṅgika to simply accept what ‘the 
world acknowledges’ to be the case (lokaprasiddha) without subjecting it 
to rational or epistemic analysis.16 Typical Prāsaṅgikas accept and prac-
tice according to the widely accepted standards and language of ordi-
                                               
 
14 Some support for this reading of Nāgārjuna can be found in his Vigrahavyāvartanī: ‘If 
I had some thesis the defect would as a consequence attach to me. But I have no thesis, 
so this defect is not applicable to me’ (translated and quoted in Westerhoff 2009: 183). 
See also Nāgārjuna Yuktiṣaṣtikā: ‘Superior individuals have no theses (pakṣa; phogs) 
and no philosophical debates; those who have no theses [themselves], how could there 
be for them opposing theses?” (translated and quoted in Tillemans 2016: 3) See also 
Ruegg (1981: 78). 
15 Some support for this reading of Candrakīrti can be found in his PPMV: ‘it is inappro-
priate for a Madhyamaka to use independently established inferences because it is im-
possible (for him) to accept either a position of his own or one of another’ (5, 21–24); 
Mādhyamikas “have no thesis of our own” (7, 24); ‘[T]he only fruit of our arguments is 
the annulment of someone else’s thesis’ (2, 6–7) (translated and quoted in Huntington 
2003). 
16 See Candrakīrti PPMV 18.8: ‘The world (loka) argues with me. I don’t argue with the 
world. What is generally agreed upon (saṃmata) in the world to exist, I too agree that it 
exists. What is generally agreed upon in the world to be nonexistent, I too agree that it 
does not exist’ (translated and cited in Tillemans (2011: 151); see also Ruegg (1981: 72). 
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nary, everyday folk but do not engage in deeper philosophical question 
about justificatory status or grounds.  
This approach to conventional truth was heavily criticized by 
philosophers that have come to be classified as Svātantrika Mādhyami-
kas. Kamalaśīla (fl. 740–795), in particular, complained that it absurdly 
entailed that every belief would be true simply because its content was 
acknowledged to be the case, including the ‘mistaken’ views that the 
Buddha claimed to be at the root of suffering.17 This approach flattens 
out conventional truth to mere belief without offering any intelligent 
means of adjudicating competing beliefs. According to Svātantrikas, for 
Madhyamaka to count as providing a plausible characterization of the 
Buddha’s teachings, it needs to provide some rational way of differenti-
ating conventional truth from falsity.  
There are a variety of ways in which the philosophers who have 
been identified as Svātantrika respond to this challenge.  These differ-
ences are not often considered in Madhyamaka ethics literature. When 
Svātantrika is referred to in this literature, it is often understood in 
terms of the position ascribed to Bhāvaviveka by Tsongkhapa.18 In this 
paper, I shall use the term Svātantrika to pick out this philosophical po-
sition.19 On Tsongkhapa’s interpretation, adherents of Svātantrika re-
spond to the above challenge by reintroducing a two-tier reductive on-
                                               
 
17 See Tillemans (2011: 154), Tillemans (2016: 39–41). 
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tology but classifying both as distinct modes of conventional reality. A 
claim about conventional reality is thus conventionally true if it can be 
established by a legitimate epistemic means (pramāṇa; e.g., perception 
or a valid inference). However, according to Tsongkhapa’s interpreta-
tion, the ontological grounds of these epistemic means were considered 
to be a more fundamental conventional reality of entities differentiated 
by possession of conventional svabhāva. Svātantrika thus appear to 
overcome the problem of flattening out truth to mere belief but at the 
cost of reintroducing the notion of svabhāva that was so thoroughly un-
dermined by Nāgārjuna in MMK. 
Between the extremes of the ‘typical Prāsaṅgika’ and Svātantrika, 
as interpreted above, are a range of Mādhyamika views which seek to 
preserve the possibility of rationally analysing conventional truth with-
out reintroducing the notion of svabhāva.20 Tillemans calls this group of 
philosophers the ‘atypical Prāsaṅgikas’ and identifies Tsongkhapa as 
their principal representative.21 There are several rational norms that 
                                               
 
20 Tillemans, himself, only proposes a bipartite division between the typical and atypi-
cal Prāsaṅgika. Moreover, the tripartite division I am proposing is not meant to exclude 
a range of alternative characterisations of Svātantrika. 
21 Tillemans calls them ‘atypical’ because, in his view, although they present themselves 
as providing the correct analysis of Candrakīrti and thus Prāsaṅgika they do not actual-
ly represent how Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika was commonly and traditionally understood. 
It is also worth noting that his use of the term ‘atypical’ is not intended as an aspersion. 
In Tillemans view, the atypical Prāsaṅgika presents a much more plausible account of 
conventional reality than the typical Prāsaṅgika. As he writes: “I fully recognize that it 
is going to be disturbing to some to read that a fourteenth-century Tibetan philosophy 
may have been, in certain significant respects, clearer and even much better philoso-
phy than that of the Indian thinkers on which it was based. That evolution toward so-
phistication should be unsurprising to the historian who recognizes that traditional 
religious thinkers are regularly obliged to disguise their innovations and creativity. 
Nonetheless, it means that much of the effort to read Tsongkhapa and other later 
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are potentially acceptable to a Prāsaṅgika for the analysis of claims 
about conventional reality. Here are at least two.  
(1) Logical or conceptual coherence and consistency are two ob-
vious candidates given that they were adhered to by Nāgārju-
na to refute his opponent’s theses. A claim about convention-
al reality might thus be falsified if, for instance, it is incon-
sistent or contradicts other widely accepted beliefs.  
(2) An appeal to ‘widely accepted epistemic standards’ might also 
be consistent with a commitment to lokaprasiddha. Can-
drakīrti considered at least four epistemic means to be widely 
accepted by the ‘people of the world’ for establishing the 
truth of ontological claims; namely, empirical observation 
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), reliable testimony record-
ed in scriptures (āgama) and/or analogical similarity 
(upamāna).22 A claim about conventional reality might thus be 
falsified if it cannot be verified by at least one of these epis-
temic means.23  
There is much more that can be said about these different Madh-
yamaka approaches to the nature and analysis of conventional truth. 
                                                                                                                     
 
Mādhyamika thinkers back onto Candrakīrti or Nāgārjuna is strained. Let’s be clear: 
Madhyamaka changes significantly over time, sometimes for the better.” (2016: 5) 
22 See Ruegg (1981: 81). 
23 This criterion for conventional truth and reality is not unproblematic. In particular, 
its defender still needs to specify the ontological grounds of these epistemic means 
without relying on a reduced level of conventional reality differentiated by possession 
of svabhāva. For a contemporary discussion of this issue, see Cowherds (2011). 
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This much should suffice, however, for us to now consider how they bear 
on contemporary debates about Madhyamaka ethics.  
 
Emptiness and Systematic Ethical Distinctions 
One locus of contemporary debate about the nature and possibilities of 
Madhyamaka ethics concerns whether a commitment to śūnyavāda is 
consistent with accepting and promoting systematic ethical distinctions 
between good and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice. Madhyamaka is 
a school in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. The principal Indian 
Madhyamaka philosophers each wrote treatises promoting Mahāyāna 
ethical values.24 Central to these values is the bodhisattva ideal. A bodhi-
sattva is one who, motivated by compassion (karuṇā) towards the suffer-
ing of others, has both committed to remaining in the realm of cyclic re-
birth (saṃsāra) in order to relieve all suffering (i.e., they have perfected 
bodhicitta) and has cultivated those moral virtues or perfections 
(pāramitā) which enable them to enact this commitment.  
Historical Indian Mādhyamika thinkers do not merely accept and 
promote specifically Mahāyāna values. They also accept unchallenged 
the Buddhist monastic rules (Vinaya); the typical Abhidharma lists of 
virtuous and non-virtuous mental factors (caitta); and the role of karma 
and its consequences as a ground for both evaluating and motivating ac-
tion. It would thus seem that historical Mādhyamika thinkers did not 
consider śūnyavāda to have any significant impact on ethics or ethical 
reasoning. Indeed, they insisted that śūnyavāda does not entail moral 
                                               
 
24 Some examples include Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī and Can-
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nihilism (ucchedavāda). But were they correct in this view? What argu-
ment could be offered to support this conclusion? And how could 
Mādhyamikas justify their assumed ethical distinctions? 
Mādhyamikas cannot consistently argue that certain actions, 
qualities and mental factors are ultimately good or bad in virtue of pos-
sessing an essential property. They nevertheless could (and often did) 
insist that ethical distinctions are a conventional matter, where holding 
views about conventional reality is consistent with śūnyavāda. While 
this might warrant the holding of ethical views, in general and as such, it 
does not yet provide reasons for the specific ethical distinctions that 
Mādhyamikas endorse. What reason can a Mādhyamika offer for why 
certain conventional actions, qualities and mental factors (e.g., compas-
sion, generosity, refraining from murder) are to be considered conven-
tionally good while certain others (e.g., selfishness, envy, murder) are to 
be considered conventionally bad?  
According to Tillemans (2010–2011), Prāsaṅgikas can justify these 
distinctions by appeal to lokaprasiddha, treating the ‘the world’s funda-
mental moral intuitions’ (364) as justificatory grounds for moral claims.25 
Finnigan (2015) takes the referent of this remark to be the typical 
Prāsaṅgika26 and gives reasons to think that, on a range of interpreta-
tions, this response is unsatisfactory. For instance, it is argued that if by 
‘the world’s moral intuitions’ is meant ‘the set of moral intuitions shared 
by every intuiting individual’, the fact of widespread intra-cultural and 
                                               
 
25 This argument is offered as a response to that presented in Finnigan and Tanaka 
(2011). 
26 Although the terminology of ‘typical Prāsaṅgika’ does not appear in the article, the 
way the position is characterized best fits this classification.  
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cross-cultural moral disagreement gives reason to think that there is no 
such agreed set (771).27 If, instead, one contextualized this claim to some 
group of intuiting individuals with some set of beliefs and values (e.g., 
the conventional beliefs and intuitions of Buddhists rather than those of 
‘the entire world’), this would problematically imply a conservatism that 
undermines the possibility of critiquing the views of others and revising 
one’s own (772–773).  
Perhaps the most plausible interpretation is one that grounds 
ethical distinctions in the widely held moral intuition that suffering is 
bad and to be prevented. While there might be widespread moral disa-
greement about a range of values, norms and rules, few would argue that 
pain and suffering are intrinsically and non-instrumentally good and to 
be promoted. The intuition that suffering is bad also seems to be in keep-
ing with the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths, the first of 
which states the fact of suffering and the remaining three (diagnosing its 
cause, inferring the possibility of its cessation, and proposing a way to 
achieve this goal) presupposes its undesirability. However, this view has 
its limitations. The ground for the truth of these claims, according to the 
lokaprasiddha of the typical Prāsaṅgika, is their widespread acceptance. 
The typical Prāsaṅgika does not engage in rational or epistemic analysis 
of what is commonly accepted by ordinary folk. Belief is thus the condi-
tion for truth rather than truth being a standard for the assessment of 
belief. It follows that the Buddha’s teachings would only be true to the 
extent that they replicate the beliefs of the majority rather than provid-
ing a corrective to widespread delusion. This not only undermines the 
universality and stability of the Buddha’s realizations and insights but 
                                               
 
27  Let alone one that conforms to the range of ethical values and commitments that are 
endorsed by Buddhists.  
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also deprives these concepts of sense. Insight, realization and wisdom 
are all flattened out to mere majority opinion. This is an unsatisfactory 
outcome. 
These arguments target the lokaprasiddha of the typical 
Prāsaṅgika. We know, however, that not all Mādhyamikas are typical 
Prāsaṅgikas and lokaprasiddha need not be interpreted as passive acqui-
escence to the majority view without positive analysis. A more liberal 
approach might admit the rational assessment of conventional claims by 
worldly epistemic standards. This is one of the positions we have at-
tributed to the atypical Prāsaṅgika. From this perspective, it could be 
argued that the Buddha correctly diagnosed a psychological problem 
faced by all sentient beings; that they are prone to various forms of suf-
fering (duḥkha). On the Buddha’s analysis, the most prominent human 
form of suffering arises from a tension between:  
1. A deep-seated desire (tṛṣṇā) for, attachment (rāga) to, and belief 
in, the persistence of oneself and what one owns and loves, and 
2. The fact that everything is causally conditioned (pratītyasamut-
pāda) and thus impermanent (anitya).  
The majority of the world’s citizens might not agree with this 
psychological analysis of the human condition but it might nevertheless 
be verified by accepted epistemic means, such as empirical observation, 
inductive and analogical reasoning, and/or reliable testimony.  
A problem remains, however. These epistemic means may well 
warrant descriptive claims about matters of (psychological) fact. Howev-
er, they do not seem adequate for ascertaining moral properties (of 
good, bad, right, wrong). How then does the atypical Prāsaṅgika justify 
their specifically evaluative distinctions beyond mere acceptance of the 
majority view?  
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One possibility is to argue that they are teleologically evaluated 
relative to a goal; namely, nirvāṇa. There are several ways of character-
izing nirvāṇa and thus several ways of conceiving this evaluative rela-
tion. If nirvāṇa is understood as the bare cessation of suffering, for in-
stance, one might argue that actions, qualities and mental factors are 
good or right to the extent that they are instrumental to this goal (or 
cause it as a consequence). If nirvāṇa is understood as a lived state of 
well-being, one might alternatively argue that actions (and so on) are 
good or right to the extent that they are constitutive of this way of liv-
ing.28 These distinct conceptions of the goal of Buddhist practice need 
not be exclusive but may be nested or variously related.  
There may also be several ways of grounding the normative force 
of evaluative claims relative to these distinct goals. For instance, norma-
tive force might be grounded in desire, such that if you do not desire to 
attain nirvāṇa, evaluative claims about actions or qualities that are in-
strumental or constitutive of this goal have no normative appeal for you. 
Alternatively, normative force might be grounded in an innate tendency, 
according to which we all, in fact, strive for nirvāṇa (whether the cessa-
tion of suffering or a lived state of well-being), as evident in our reac-
tions and emotional responses. On either account, an atypical Prāsaṅgika 
could argue that while evaluative distinctions are themselves not evalu-
ated using ordinary epistemic means, the desired or innately aspired for 
goal, relative to which they are normatively grounded, is a matter of 
empirically verifiable descriptive psychology. 
                                               
 
28 See Finnigan (2014 and forthcoming-a) for discussions of these distinct possibilities 
and how they bear on rational reconstructions of Buddhist thought as a normative eth-
ical theory. 
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This might seem to be a plausible rendering of Madhyamaka eth-
ics from the perspective of the atypical Mādhyamika. It is consistent 
with both śūnyavāda and an epistemically-constrained conception of 
lokaprasiddha. Nevertheless, it has two major implications that are po-
tentially problematic for Buddhists, in general, as well as the Mādhyami-
ka Śāntideva, in particular.  
First, the above account would seem to rule out appeal to tradi-
tional conceptions of karmic consequences as a way of justifying evalua-
tive claims because the operations of karma are not considered to be ver-
ifiable using ordinary epistemic means.29 Some philosophers argue that 
this is all for the best.30 It has significant implications, however. Histori-
cal Mādhyamikas not only accepted the role of karma as a basis for ac-
tion evaluation,31 they also frequently appeal to the notion of karmic 
merit (puṇya) as a central means by which bodhisattvas are considered 
to alleviate the suffering of other sentient beings.32 Śāntideva’s Bodhi-
caryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya both emphasize the role of bodhisatt-
va’s benefitting other sentient beings by accumulating and sharing their 
karmic merit rather than offering direct physical or material assis-
                                               
 
29 Traditionally, the operations of karma have been epistemically grounded in the scrip-
tural testimony of one who has reliable access to things unknowable by the sense facul-
ties given their omniscience. However, as pointed out by Tillemans (2010–2011), omnis-
cience is not a quality that can be verified by worldly epistemic means and thus is in-
admissible to a Madhyamaka constrained by lokaprasiddha.   
30 See Batchelor (2011, 2015), Tillemans (2010–2011, 2016: ch.8) 
31 According to Gombrich (1997: ch.2), the notion of karma lies at the very heart of the 
Buddhist worldview.  
32 For a discussion of the philosophical issues this gives rise to, see Keown (2001), Velez 
de Cea (2004), Adams (2005). 
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tance.33 These claims and assumptions may need to be radically revised 
to be consistent with the evaluative standards of the atypical Prāsaṅgi-
ka.34 
Second, the account offered above suggests that evaluative claims 
either take the form of desire-dependent hypothetical imperatives or are 
normatively grounded in goals that implicitly inform our behaviour. 
However, some read Śāntideva as arguing that a particular evaluative 
position (i.e., great compassion, often taken to mean altruism or impar-
tial benevolence)35 is entailed by a proper understanding of reality. That 
is, if one has a right understanding of ontology, one will not only have a 
reason to remove the suffering of all other sentient beings but one will 
also be obliged to act in this way.36 Williams (1998) provides a highly in-
fluential argument that attempts to establish that this argument fails. 
Since Williams’ analysis of Śāntideva is at the heart of much contempo-
rary dispute about the nature of Madhyamaka ethics, it is worth consid-
ering it in some detail. As in the previous section, competing views on 
the nature of conventional truth will function as an organizing principle 
when considering the various positions advanced in current literature. 
 
                                               
 
33 See Clayton (2006: ch.4), Goodman (2009). 
34 Rather than rejecting the Buddhist appeal to karmic consequences, both Batchelor 
and Tillemans opt for radical revision, arguing that it can only be acceptable if under-
stood in terms that are grounded in human psychological states (intentions and moti-
vations) with empirically verifiable consequences. This remains consistent with Gom-
brich (n.29), but on a nuanced interpretation. 
35 Although, strictly speaking, these are distinct notions which warrant distinct anal-
yses, this paper shall treat them interchangeably unless it makes a difference to the 
argument (in which case I shall highlight the difference). 
36 See Harris (2015: 203–205). 
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Does Emptiness of Self Give Good Reasons for Altruism?  
In BCA 8:101-103, Śāntideva appears to argue from the fact that we are 
empty of self (ātman) to the conclusion that we should exercise impar-
tial benevolence.37 He writes:38 
The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the 
combination of constituents, like an army, are not real. 
The person who experiences suffering does not exist. To 
whom will that suffering belong? (101) 
Without exception, no sufferings belong to anyone. They 
must be warded off simply because they are suffering. 
Why is any limitation put on this? (102) 
If one asks why suffering should be prevented, no one dis-
putes that! If it must be prevented, then all of it must be. 
If not, then this goes for oneself as for anyone. (103) 
One way to reconstruct these verses is as the following argument: 
(1) There is no self (ātman); ‘we’ are just composites of 
psycho-physical elements, and composites are not real; 
                                               
 
37 English translations of this text can be found in Batchelor (1992), Crosby and Skilton 
(1996), Wallace and Wallace (1997), Padmakara Translation Group (2006). Citations 
come from Crosby and Skilton. 
38 There is some dispute about whether Śāntideva actually wrote these verses or 
whether they were inserted by an editor at some later date. See Saito (1993, 1994), 
Crosby and Skilton (1996: xxix–xxxiii), Garfield, Jenkins Priest (2015: 56–58, 68), Good-
man (2015: 155). 
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(2) Given (1), there is no basis for distinguishing my pain 
from yours; pains are ownerless; 
(3) Pain is bad and to be prevented; 
(4) Given (2) and (3), either all pain is to be prevented (we 
should act altruistically without partiality) or no pain is to 
be prevented (we should be apathetic without partiality); 
(C) All pain is to be prevented (we should act altruistically 
without partiality). 
According to Williams, this argument turns on removing the ontological 
grounds of egoism. Since there is no self, there are no grounds for distin-
guishing my suffering from yours. It follows that egoistic self-interest in 
preventing one’s own suffering is irrational and thus, for reasons of ra-
tional consistency, one should be impartially benevolent. Williams con-
tends, however, that there are two possible ways of interpreting the first 
premise of this argument, both of which fail to secure this conclusion:  
1(a) Śāntideva denies the ultimate reality of a self (ātman, 
understood as a persistent, unchanging, essence of per-
sons) but allows that persons are conventionally real.  
According to Williams, if this is what Śāntideva meant then his 
argument fails because it does not remove the grounds for egoistic self-
interest. One can still privilege the interests of a conventional self.  
1(b) Śāntideva denies both the ultimate and conventional 
reality of selves. All that exist are psycho-physical ele-
ments in causal relations.  
This interpretation removes all possible ontological grounds for 
egoistic self-interest, and is, in Williams’ view, the only way Śāntideva’s 
argument will work. However, as Williams argues, this interpretation has 
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dire consequences for ordinary ethical transactions. By removing the 
distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’, it makes nonsense of a bodhisatt-
va’s commitment to sacrifice their ‘own’ karmic merit for the sake of 
‘others’. Since there are no ‘others’ there is no object of a bodhisattva’s 
compassion or altruistic concern. By removing the notion of an agent, 
there can also be no actions of a bodhisattva that could be evaluated and 
accrue merit—and thus no act of ‘committing’ oneself to removing the 
suffering of others.39 Williams concludes that Śāntideva faces a dilemma, 
neither horn of which is acceptable. As a result, Śāntideva not only fails 
to provide a rational basis for altruism but, according to Williams, if you 
follow his argument to its logical conclusion, it destroys the bodhisattva 
path. 
Most contemporary responses to Williams’s argument deny that 
Śāntideva intended interpretation 1(b). These responses typically 
emerge from reflections on a puzzle concerning premise (1). This prem-
ise is most straightforwardly read as a statement of ultimate truth from 
the perspective of Abhidharma ontology, according to which only caus-
ally related psycho-physical elements are real and persons are unreal. 
But Śāntideva is a Mādhyamika. Why would a Mādhyamika argue from 
an Ābhidharmika ontological position? Some offer a methodological ex-
planation of this apparent fact.40 Others deny that this is the best way to 
                                               
 
39 Williams not only thinks this view has dire ethical implications, he also thinks it pre-
supposes mistaken views on the metaphysics of personality. He insists, for instance, 
that the reductive analysis of persons as collectives of elements presupposes the con-
cept of a person (i.e., parts are identified in relation to the whole rather than the whole 
derived from an otherwise random collection of parts). 
40 For instance, according to Siderits (2000: 421; 2015: 136–137), the audience for this 
argument are Ābhidharmikas who Śāntideva sought to convince had ontological com-
 
 
22 Finnigan, Madhyamaka Ethics 
 
read premise (1), offering instead an alternative interpretation that is 
more in keeping with Madhyamaka.41 Whichever way one goes, it would 
seem that neither an Ābhidharmika nor a Mādhyamika would accept 
1(b). Not only do Mādhyamikas accept the conventional reality of per-
sons, so too do Ābhidharmikas. It has also been noted that Śāntideva 
writes elsewhere as if there are conventional selves.42 Moreover, some 
argue that since the implications of 1(b) are so disastrous for ethics, it 
would be more charitable not to attribute this interpretation to Śāntide-
va.43  
While rejecting interpretation 1(b) might avoid one horn of Wil-
liams’s dilemma, it does not thereby successfully navigate the other. In-
terpreting premise (1) in terms of 1(a) is also problematic, for several 
reasons.  
First, how are we to understand premise (2) and its entailment 
from 1(a)? As above, these premises seem to be most straightforwardly 
read as claims about ultimate reality from an Abhidharma perspective. 
On this view, pain (a kind of vedanā) is a proper constituent of ultimate 
                                                                                                                     
 
mitments which entailed the Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal that is accepted by 
Mādhyamikas. 
41 I will discuss three alternative interpretations, below. 
42 See Clayton (2001: 88, 90; 2006: 97); Harris (2015: 99). It could also be argued that, to 
the extent that Śāntideva is writing to an audience, he must also presuppose the con-
ventional existence of other people (thanks to Garrett Cullity for this suggestion). It 
might be rejoined that BCA was written as an internal dialogue and not necessarily with 
an audience in mind. However, there are many verses articulated in terms of the sec-
ond person, where this fact puts pressure on this rejoinder. See, for instance, BCA 8.92–
94. 
43 See Harris (2015: 97). 
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reality (an element of the psycho-physical aggregate to which persons 
are reducible). Since persons, subjects and agents are not ultimately real, 
pain does not ultimately occur in or for anyone; it just occurs. It is not 
obvious that a Mādhyamika can accept this premise. Certainly not if con-
strued as a statement about ultimate reality since, as we know, 
Mādhyamikas typically deny that anything ultimately exists (in the 
sense given to this notion by Ābhidharmikas).44 It might be possible for a 
Svātantrika Mādhyamika to rationally accept these premises if construed 
as claims about (a judiciously revised) conventional reality.45 From the 
perspective of the typical Prāsaṅgika, however, persons and instances of 
pain have the same ontological standing; namely, as constituents of the 
conventional reality as accepted by most ordinary people (lokaprasid-
dha). From this perspective, (2) is false. Common sense distinguishes be-
tween the pains of distinct subjects.  
What about the atypical Prāsaṅgika? The answer to this question 
might depend on how we understand the idea of ‘ownerless pain’. There 
seem to be at least two ways to understand this claim. First, as the claim 
that pains are not mental events that are possessed by persons (where 
this assumes a possession-relation between two entities; a pain event 
and a person). Second, as a claim that pains just occur without being felt 
or experienced by a subject. Williams takes the latter to be the sense re-
                                               
 
44 While Śāntideva may not, himself, have accepted an Abhidharma ontology, it is not 
thereby inconsistent to interpret him as presenting an argument based on its assump-
tion. See note 39. 
45 That is, to the extent that Ābhidharmikas can consistently maintain this view, so too 
can Svātantrika if the claim is suitably qualified with a ‘conventional’ operator. It is 
important to note, however, that there may be cases where we might question whether 
Ābhidharmikas can consistently maintain the view at issue. The qualification ‘might’ is 
intended to indicate awareness of this issue without attempting to resolve it.  
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quired by Śāntideva’s argument and insists that it does not make sense. 
In his view, conscious mental states necessarily involve an element of 
subjectivity; phenomenal content always appears to or for a subject. 
Clayton (2001) responds that to reject the idea of ownerless pains is to 
‘effectively dismiss all of Buddhism: the heart of Buddhist insight is the 
mystery of experience without subject’ (86). This is not necessarily true. 
Prominent Yogācāra and Pramānavāda thinkers maintained that ordi-
nary conscious experiences necessarily involve both phenomenal con-
tent and the subjective experiencing thereof.46 A version of this idea is 
accepted and defended by several prominent Yogācāra Svātantrika 
Mādhyamikas,47 although it does not seem in keeping with the form of 
Svātantrika that we have been discussing in this paper. To the extent 
that it reflects a common intuition about the nature of consciousness, it 
might nevertheless be consistent with the lokaprasiddha of typical 
Prāsaṅgikas. The case of the atypical Prāsaṅgika is more challenging. A 
prominent analysis of this thesis (subjectivity analysed as svasaṃve-
dana) was rejected by Tsongkhapa, although there is reason to think that 
his arguments against this view would not vindicate the notion of own-
erless pain at the level of conventional truth.48 For these reasons, it 
                                               
 
46 This idea is captured in the notion of ordinary experiences having ‘subject-object 
duality’. See Vasubandhu in TSN, Dignāga in PS, and Dharmakīrti in PV and PVin. For a 
brief overview of these ideas and references to relevant secondary literature, see Finni-
gan (forthcoming-b). 
47 It is accepted and defended by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, for instance.  
48 More specifically, Tsongkhapa rejects analyses of subject-object duality in the form of 
svasaṃvedana, the idea that consciousness self-reflects or is reflexive. By contrast, he 
argues that subjectivity is the result of an inference rather than a necessary constituent 
of conventional conscious experience. One might accept Tsongkhapa’s conclusion and 
still maintain that conventional conscious experience typically involves (an inferred 
sense of) subjectivity. That is, an analysis of phenomenology need not alter the analy-
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would thus seem that premise (2) is problematic from a range of Madh-
yamaka perspectives.    
We might also query the status of premise (3), the claim that pain 
is bad and to be prevented. If (3) is understood as a statement of ultimate 
reality, then it is unacceptable to a Mādhyamika.49 Could it be accepted 
as a conventional truth? To the extent that it is a common moral intui-
tion that is accepted by most ordinary people, it is acceptable to the typ-
ical Prāsaṅgika. Indeed, this might be one way to read Śāntideva’s quali-
fication that ‘no one disputes that!’ (BCA 8.103)50 Could it be accepted by 
the atypical Prāsaṅgika? It might seem that their response would be 
much the same as the typical Prāsaṅgika. However, this might depend on 
whether the atypical Prāsaṅgika thinks that conventional claims must be 
verified to be held as true or merely unfalsified by rational and epistemic 
analysis. Perhaps the rational norm of consistency might verify the truth 
of (3) (as more consistent with other widely accepted moral intuitions 
than its denial) but it is not clear that it can be verified by epistemic 
norms, which are concerned with matters of descriptive fact rather than 
normative evaluation. If, however, the position is that conventional 
claims need merely be unfalsified by these epistemic means, then (3) 
might be reasonably held as conventionally true.  
                                                                                                                     
 
sans. See Williams (2013) for an overview of Tsongkhapa’s arguments against 
svasaṃvedana. See also Garfield (2006) 
49 See Harris (2015: 97); Garfield, Jenkins, and Priest (2015: 67); Siderits (2015: 132). 
50 Another way to read this qualification is as a statement of his opponent’s position; 
i.e., ‘given that you maintain that pain is bad and to be removed’. So understood, it 
doesn’t matter whether or not it is acceptable to a Mādhyamika, as the entailment 
could still go through for those who accept this premise (thanks to Tim Mulgan for this 
suggestion). The more pressing question, however, is whether it is acceptable to a 
Mādhyamika.   
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The case of Svātantrika is interesting. We have been presenting 
the position as rationally analysing conventional claims in terms that 
assume a reductive ontology (albeit one that holds within the scope of 
conventional reality). In the Abhidharma context, reductive analysis 
eliminates social, linguistic and conceptual construction to expose a 
mind-independent reality. Interestingly, this reduction is not thought to 
eliminate evaluative considerations. Abhidharma thinkers assumed that 
the mental elements that constitute ultimate reality are fundamentally 
valenced (positive, negative or neutral). Pain is thus ultimately bad, not 
because we judge pain to be bad but because its ultimate valence is nega-
tive, a fact that is bodily registered and evident in our aversive reactions. 
This is a fascinating idea but highly controversial. It is also not clear that 
it is equivalent to the claim that pain is bad and to be removed.51 Svātan-
trikas, unlike Ābdhidharmikas can avoid some of these problems, how-
ever, given that they clearly maintain that their reduction occurs in the 
sphere of the conventional. There is thus no question, for them, of re-
ducing away all social, linguistic, conceptual construction from the re-
duced level of conventional reality.  
While premise (3) seems to be acceptable to all Mādhyamikas, we 
might still question the entailment from (4) to the conclusion. Premise 
(4) is a disjunction between removing all pain and removing none. The 
conclusion affirms one of these disjuncts. What reason is there for this 
affirmation?52 Why should a proper understanding of the nature of per-
sons lead us to extend our (otherwise egoistic) concern to the removal of 
                                               
 
51 The descriptive claim that we are averse to pain is not identical to the prescriptive 
claim that pain should be removed. 
52 This issue is raised by Harris (2011), who argues that Śāntideva leaves the answer 
undetermined. 
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all pain rather than, for instance, ceasing to care at all about its occur-
rence? It could be argued that premise (3) supplies the necessary reason; 
it is because pain is bad and to be removed which, as we have already 
suggested, is acceptable as a conventional truth by all Mādhyamikas.  
Even if we grant the entailment between (4) and the conclusion, 
Williams argues that the overall argument has a structural flaw; namely, 
it attempts to infer certain prescriptive claims about how we ‘ought’ to 
behave from certain descriptive facts about what ‘is’ the case. The at-
tempt to derive an ought-from-is is a fallacy that was famously diag-
nosed by Hume. It might seem, however, that premise (3) inserts the 
requisite normative element to avoid this charge. That is, the normative 
claim that pain is bad and to be removed seems to be doing the norma-
tive work with respect to the conclusion and not the descriptive claim 
about the emptiness of persons.   
Finally, even if the ‘is-ought’ issue can be resolved, the argument 
still faces Williams’s fundamental concern with 1(a); namely, if we opt 
for this interpretation, how does it avoid reinstating self-interested ego-
ism and thereby undermining Śāntideva’s argument?  
While Mādhyamikas may be able to accept some of the premises 
in the argument reconstructed from BCA 8.101–103, it would thus seem 
that they cannot accept them all. Does this mean that Williams is right 
and Śāntideva’s argument fails? Not necessarily. We might still query 
whether the idea contained in these verses is best reconstructed as an 
argument consisting of these premises or even whether there is a better 
argument to be found in Śāntideva’s thought. We might also query 
whether his verses are best understood as presenting arguments at all. 
This article shall conclude by considering three alternative reconstruc-
tions of Śāntideva’s thought that have been advanced in recent literature 
and shall assess whether they offer a more plausible account of the rela-
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tionships between a Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness, conven-
tional truth, compassion and impartial benevolence. 
 
The ‘We are All One’ Conventional Self Argument 
The first alternative draws on additional verses contained in BCA 8 to 
justify modifying Williams’s reconstructed argument in a way that would 
consistently allow a moderate sense of egoistic self-interest. According 
to this alternative, the sense of conventional persons that is reinstated in 
1(a) is not the unrevised, common sense notion that ‘we’ are all distinct 
persons. Rather, it is a revised, ‘enlightened’ view that ‘we’ are just as-
pects of one, whole, unified, integrated conventional self. A version of 
this idea is defended by Wetleson (2002).53 Wetleson derives evidence for 
this revised conventional self from an ‘organismic analogy’ (64) he finds 
in the following verses: 
If you think that it is for the person who has pain to guard 
against it, a pain in the foot is not of the hand, so why is 
the one protected by the other? (BCA 8:99) 
In the same way that the hands and other limbs are loved 
because they form part of the body, why are embodied 
creatures not likewise loved because they form part of the 
universe? (BCA 8.114) 
According to Wetleson, this organismic analogy extends to relations be-
tween persons, which are thereby to be understood as aspects of a more 
comprehensive organism—a unified but multi-aspected conventional 
                                               
 
53 See Priest (2015) for a different argument to a similar conclusion. 
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self.54 The clear advantage of this suggestion is that it is consistent with 
egoistic self-interest and thus avoids Williams’s main challenge to Śān-
tideva. Since we are all part of the same self, interest in one’s own wel-
fare includes an interest in that of others as part of one’s own welfare 
(52). The conclusion of this argument is no longer that we should be im-
partially benevolent but, rather, we should be partially benevolent, 
where the revised scope of this partiality encompasses all sentient be-
ings. 
Despite overcoming Williams’s major objection to Śāntideva’s ar-
gument, this account has several problems from the perspective of 
Madhyamaka. First, it implies a radical revision to Williams’s premise (2). 
It is no longer the case that all pains are similar in being ownerless but, 
rather, all pains are similar in being mine.55 To say that a pain is mine is 
typically taken to mean that it is experienced by me. However, it is high-
ly counter-intuitive to say that I experience all pain. Not only is it widely 
assumed that we do not and cannot literally experience the pain that is 
experienced by another,56 this (conventional) fact informs our attitudes, 
reactions and conduct. This revision to premise (2) is clearly unaccepta-
ble to the typical Prāsaṅgika, who only agrees with what is widely ac-
cepted by the world. 
                                               
 
54 See Wetleson (2002: 64, 62, 68).  
55 See Williams (1998: 40). 
56 We might empathise with their pain but this does not mean that we literally feel 
what they feel. We might also come to feel a similar emotion (as in the case of fear con-
tagion) but this does not mean that we literally feel what they feel (the very same sen-
sation of fear).  
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 It would also seem that, for this very same reason, the typical 
Prāsaṅgika would also reject Wetleson’s revised notion of the ‘one’ con-
ventional self. It is much more widely believed that persons are separate 
and distinct than that they are all aspects of a single, integrated being. It 
is also not clear that this idea is acceptable to Svātantrika, who ground 
conventional claims in a reduced conventional ontology, which is meth-
odologically antithetical to increased unification.  
What about atypical Prāsaṅgikas? Could they accept the conven-
tional reality of a unified self? The answer will depend on the assumed 
criteria for conventional existence. According to Wetleson, conventional 
claims are determined on the basis of pragmatic considerations which 
are validated by consensus (43) and linguistic use (48). The criterion for 
conventional reality thus seems to be a matter of collectively agreed so-
cial construction. There are two problems with this view, however. For 
the ‘one’ self to count as conventionally real, according to this criterion, 
it must either be a construction about which there is collective agree-
ment (lokaprasiddha in the sense accepted by the typical Prāsaṅgika) or 
one about which there should be consensus. We have already argued that 
it does not satisfy the former. This criterion also does not seem robust 
enough to satisfy the atypical Prāsaṅgika who, as we have characterized 
the view, takes widely accepted epistemic norms as standards for truth. 
Further argument is needed to show that the notion of a single, integrat-
ed self can satisfy such standards as empirical observation and inductive 
inference and thus should be accepted.57 
                                               
 
57 There may be further issues with this argument. For instance, according to Priest 
(2015), the relation between a foot and a hand does not appropriately generalise to the 
view that we should care for one another as aspects of the one organism because, in the 
former case, the hand does not literally care for the foot (it is mediated by a conscious-
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The ‘No Relevant Difference’ or ‘Rationality’ Argument 
A second alternative to Williams’ reconstruction of the argument con-
tained in BCA 8.101–103 draws on verses 90–98 to reconstruct a more 
minimal and seemingly more plausible argument from Śāntideva’s 
thought. Versions of this argument can be found in Williams (1998: ch.2), 
Pettit (1999), Clayton (2001), Wetleson (2002), and Garfield, Jenkins, and 
Priest (2015). The argument turns on the idea that there is no relevant 
difference between you and me to justify prioritizing the prevention of 
my pain over yours. We might reconstruct this argument as follows:  
 (1) Egoistic self-interest assumes that there is something 
relevantly distinctive about oneself that justifies prioritiz-
ing one’s own interest over that of others; 
(2) (1) is false. There is nothing relevantly distinctive 
about oneself that justifies prioritizing one’s own interest 
over that of others; 
(3) Pain is bad and to be prevented; 
(4) Given (2) and (3), there is no good reason to privilege 
preventing my pain over yours; 
(C) (Given 4), self-interest is irrational and so, for reasons 
of rational consistency, one should prevent pain without 
partiality. 
                                                                                                                     
 
ness that cares for both). Moreover, it might also seem that the very idea that we are all 
aspects of the one, unified self is the philosophical position of one of the main philo-
sophical rivals to Buddhism; namely, Advaita Vedānta.  
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As Clayton (2001: 91) points out, this has the same structure as anti-
discrimination arguments. Since I am not special in any morally relevant 
sense, my suffering should not count as more important than yours and 
so I should treat your suffering as just as important as mine. An ad-
vantage of this argument is that it does not presuppose the idea of own-
erless pains, which we have argued is questionable from a Madhyamaka 
perspective. It also tackles Williams’s problem of egoism head-on and 
appears to shift the burden of proof onto the egoist rather than provid-
ing an independent proof for impartial benevolence.58 Its plausibility, 
however, hangs on the truth of (2). What reasons are there to accept this 
premise and do they require taking a perspective on conventional reality 
that is unacceptable to Madhyamaka?  
 In BCA 8:94–98, Śāntideva seems to offer two reasons for thinking 
that (conventional) persons are relevantly similar to justify equal consid-
eration with respect to the prevention of pain. The first reason is con-
tained in BCA verses 94–96:  
I should dispel the suffering of others because it is suffer-
ing like my own suffering. I should help others too be-
cause of their nature as beings, which is like my own be-
ing (BCA 8:94) 
When happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is 
so special about me that I strive after happiness only for 
myself? (BCA 8:95) 
                                               
 
58 See Pettit (2000: 125), Garfield, Jenkins, Priest (2015, 68). 
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When fear and suffering are disliked by me and others 
equally, what is so special about me that I protect myself 
and not the other? (BCA 8:96) 
The intended answer to these rhetorical questions is: ‘Nothing’. There is 
nothing special about me to warrant privileging the prevention of my 
pain over yours. Why? Because we are relevantly similar in our nature as 
sentient beings who desire happiness and seek to avoid suffering.59 
Whether or not we think this is a sufficient reason for the conclusion,60 it 
would seem to be a reason that all Mādhyamikas could accept if con-
strued as a conventional truth that is either accepted on the basis of ra-
tional reflection, epistemic analysis or a common intuition that is widely 
accepted by most ordinary people. Moreover, it would seem to be a rea-
son all Mādhyamikas would want to accept given that it is a central pre-
supposition of the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths and all Mādhyamikas seek 
to be consistent with the Buddha’s teachings. 
This is not the only reason offered by Śāntideva, however. The fol-
lowing verse offers a slightly different one: ‘If I give them no protection 
because their suffering does not afflict me, why do I protect my body 
against the future suffering when it does not afflict me?’ (BCA 8:97). Here, 
Śāntideva seems to be pointing out that egoistic self-interest is future 
oriented. The pain we seek to prevent is not pain we are currently expe-
riencing; it is pain that will occur in the future. However, Śāntideva ap-
pears to suggest that a future self is similar to contemporary others in 
(having the property of) being non-identical to our present self. And he 
                                               
 
59 See Garfield, Jenkins, Priest (2015: 72).  
60 We might agree, for instance, that this is one moral consideration but deny that it is 
the only one.  
34 Finnigan, Madhyamaka Ethics 
 
infers from this fact that there is thus no good reason to privilege pre-
venting pain to a future self over that of a contemporary other since in 
neither case is the pain experienced by me. Moreover, he insists that it is 
no good saying ‘but the future self will be me’ because this, he claims, is a 
‘false construction’ (8:98).61  
 It is not obvious that Mādhyamikas can accept this second reason. 
First, it seems to be most straightforwardly read as a claim about ulti-
mate reality from an Abhidharma perspective. According to Abhidharma, 
‘we’ are just continua of psycho-physical elements with momentarily 
fleeting existence. It follows that none of the ultimate constituents of 
(what is conventionally called) ‘me’ now will be the same as the ultimate 
constituents of (what is conventionally called) ‘me’ at any future time 
and so, quite literally, the term ‘me’ does not pick out the same person 
from one moment to the next. Given this ontology, one can straightfor-
wardly infer analogical similarity in ‘non-identity’ between (a) current-
me and future-me to (b) current-me and current-you.  
As we know, Mādhyamikas deny that there is an ultimate reality, 
so construed, and thus cannot accept this reason as a statement of ulti-
mate truth. If construed as a rationally revised claim about conventional 
reality, it might be acceptable to a Svātantrika Mādhyamika. It would be 
inconsistent with the lokaprasiddha of the typical Prāsaṅgika, however. 
While most people may not believe that they have a soul or essence (āt-
man) that exists permanently and unchanging through time and across 
lives, it is ordinarily assumed that the embodied being that is ourselves 
now will be (despite inevitable changes) continuous in several important 
                                               
 
61 A detailed examination of this second reason can be found in Williams (1998: ch.2). 
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respects (e.g., memory, body) with our embodied being in the future in a 
way that it is not continuous with the embodied being of others.  
It is also not clear that this second reason is consistent with the 
lokaprasiddha of the atypical Prāsaṅgika, given that it has implications 
that are not only in tension with norms of rationality but might also un-
dermine our rational capacities. A belief in a (conventionally) enduring 
self not only informs much of our ordinary conduct (e.g., we brush our 
own teeth, rather than the teeth of others, to prevent the decay that we 
would otherwise experience in future)62 but to suppose otherwise would 
seem to undermine our capacity to plan as forms of instrumental reason-
ing that concern ourselves.63  
Moreover, as Harris (2015) points out, just as we have moral intui-
tions to take care of others, we also have moral intuitions that admit a 
moderate amount of egoism (109). A certain amount of self-care is often 
considered to be morally praiseworthy. We commend those who, for in-
stance, quit smoking to prevent cancer, exercise to prevent obesity relat-
ed illnesses, refrain from drinking over the legal limit before driving. 
While these actions might benefit both the agent in the future as well as 
others, we typically would not blame or criticize the agent for perform-
ing these preventative actions if done purely for the sake of their own 
future well-being. It would thus seem that, with respect to some moral 
intuitions, the fact that the ‘future self will be me’ does count as a good 
reason for performing certain forms of action. Harris takes this as 
grounds for shifting the burden of proof back to Śāntideva. While em-
phasizing the similarity of (conventional) persons might support certain 
                                               
 
62 See Williams (1998: 36). 
63 See Wetleson (2002: 55). 
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moral intuitions, emphasizing their differences supports others. A new 
argument is needed to show why the latter are irrational and the former 
not (2015: 110). 
A final issue with this argument is that the textual support for 
this reconstruction is drawn from verses other than 101–103. It thus 
seems to avoid the problems Williams raises for verses 101–103 by recon-
structing a different argument for impartial benevolence from a differ-
ent set of verses that are concerned with the same issue. While this al-
ternative argument is perhaps more plausible (particularly if one focuses 
only on the first reason offered to justify [2], as do Garfield, Jenkins, 
Priest [2015]), this is in part due to the fact that it omits the problematic 
elements that Williams finds so objectionable in 101–103.  
 
A Meditational Technique Aimed at Psychological Transformation 
The third alternative this article will consider (but by no means the only 
remaining possibility) denies that BCA 8.101–103 provides an argument 
aimed at proving that we should be impartially beneficent. Rather, ac-
cording to this alternative, these verses are best read as raising consider-
ations that, in the context of meditation, will help undermine the at-
tachment to self, or self-grasping, that underpins many of our negative 
emotions. The objective of these verses is thus not to establish the ra-
tionality of impartial beneficence but, rather, to assist in actually gener-
ating a compassionate concern for others when incorporated into medi-
tative practice. 
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 A version of this suggestion was initially proposed by Pettit (2000) 
and subsequently defended by Harris (2015) and Westerhoff (2015).64 Ac-
cording to Pettit, prominent Tibetan Gelug Madhyamaka thinkers, 
Tsongkhapa in particular, differentiate two problematic senses of ‘self’ 
that need to be eliminated. The first is ātman, the philosophical view that 
there is an enduring substance, wholly present from moment to moment, 
that exists separate from and as the owner of events in conscious aware-
ness. The second, however, is an innate and largely unconscious sense of 
self-grasping that Gelugpas think underlie our negative emotions and 
can be exposed when subjects are placed in situations of emotional du-
ress, (such as when—imaginatively—experiencing unjust accusations or 
great praise).65 Pettit calls this sense of self-grasping an ‘innate miscon-
ception of self’ (132) or an ‘emotionally conflicted self’ (132). From this 
perspective, ordinary, conventional life is to be understood as a mixture 
of an ordinary, innocent sense of persons (useful for practical and ethical 
transactions) and a problematic misconceived sense of self that informs 
our negative emotions.  
If we grant this distinction, Śāntideva’s thought might then be 
read as merely providing suggestions that, in the context of meditative 
practice, help undermine the ‘innate misconceived self’ and contribute to 
positive changes in one’s moral psychology. For instance, if one recog-
nizes a habitual selfish tendency in oneself (or its emergence in a par-
ticular instance), reflecting on the idea that we are empty of selves might 
help undermine the self-grasping that is constitutive of this emotional 
state and thereby help transform it to another psychological state, such 
                                               
 
64 This proposal is also discussed by Clayton (2001: 92), Garfield, Jenkins, and Priest 
(2015), Jenkins (2015: 115). 
65 This point is also discussed in Tillemans (2016: 32–35). 
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as unselfishness or compassionate concern for others. According to 
Westerhoff (2015), merely reflecting on (or believing the truth of) this 
idea is insufficient for bringing about this transformation. What is re-
quired is a ‘meditational realization’ of the truth of this claim. Whatever 
this amounts to and whether or not Westerhoff is right, the relevant kind 
of transformation is considered to result not in a belief about what one 
should do but, rather, a change in what one actually does, given an un-
derstanding of emotions as behavioural tendencies that habitually impli-
cate how we react.66  
There are several advantages of this alternative reading of Śān-
tideva’s verses. First, it avoids Williams’s charge that Śāntideva falla-
ciously infers a normative conclusion from descriptive facts. On this ac-
count, one psychological state (i.e., realizing the truth of a claim) helps 
produce another psychological state with behavioural implications, both 
of which are matters of descriptive fact.67 Second, it avoids Williams’s 
charge that the argument fails to prove its conclusion because it fails to 
remove the grounds of egoism. This is because it is no longer conceived 
as an argument aimed at proving a conclusion. Third, this way of under-
standing 101–103 avoids some of the problems that arise for the idea of 
‘ownerless pains’ and the Abhidharma-style reduction it implies because 
it does not require Mādhyamikas to accept these ideas. Rather, it could 
be argued that Mādhyamikas merely utilise these ideas as a matter of 
skilful means (upāya) aimed at psychological transformation rather than 
endorsing them as positive theses. Fourth, this reading might explain 
                                               
 
66 It is also argued that such transformation also changes how one experiences the 
world given the assumption that emotions implicate our phenomenology. See Wester-
hoff (2015: 213).  
67 See Harris (2011), Westerhoff (2015: 212). 
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why these verses are contained in a chapter titled ‘The Perfection of 
Meditative Absorption’. Finally, this reading is suggestive of broader 
Buddhist themes concerning the role of self-conception and self-grasping 
in moral psychology, thereby promising to complement a more extensive 
body of Buddhist literature. 
As with the previous alternatives, this reading of BCA 8.101–103 is 
not unproblematic. One issue concerns whether it can be considered an 
accurate reconstruction of the idea contained in Śāntideva’s verses. As 
pointed out by Williams, Pettit explicitly attributes this distinction be-
tween (a) a belief in a philosophical ātman and (b) an innate sense of self 
implicated by our negative emotions to later Tibetan Gelug Mādhyamikas 
writing between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is not obvious 
that the seventh-century Śāntideva himself had this distinction in mind 
when writing these verses.68  
This reconstruction also seems to imply a more sophisticated 
analysis of emotions than that presupposed by Śāntideva’s verses. In 
101–103, pain seems to be conceived as a simple and unstructured mental 
occurrence. This analysis of psychological transformation, however, re-
quires an analysis of emotions as behavioural dispositions that are con-
stituted by certain intentional attitudes and beliefs. There thus seems to 
be a mismatch in presuppositions about the nature of mental states.69  
                                               
 
68 See Williams (1999: 147), Harris (2015: 114). 
69 It could be responded that this does not matter if the verse is understood as merely a 
skilful means to try to bring about the cessation of selfishness. That is, while it might 
not be true that pains are simple, subject-less occurrences, it might be useful to think of 
them in this way if one wants to cease being selfishly attached to preventing your own 
pain over that of others. It might alternatively be responded that the issue at stake for 
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One might also query whether there is a genuine distinction to be 
drawn between (a) and (b). For instance, (b) is sometimes characterized 
as a latent tendency to reify the self, a grasping at permanence and self-
essence. However, this is also how the notion of ātman is sometimes con-
ceived. There might thus seem to be no substantive difference between 
the two. If this is right, however, one might use this fact to resist the 
previous objection. That is, one could argue that both are implicated by 
the denial of self, and thus one does not need the later Tibetan distinc-
tion to draw the latter sense out of Śāntideva’s thought.  
One might nevertheless wonder whether the denial of self in the 
sense of both (a) and (b) could allow for an innocent and acceptable no-
tion of conventional self. As reconstructed by Pettit, (b) is a sense of self 
constitutive of negative emotions. Williams (1999) expresses doubt that 
one could differentiate this from a sense of self implicated by positive 
emotions or even one that is emotionally neutral but necessary for ordi-
nary, practical transactions.70 If there is no clear difference, one might 
then worry whether eliminating (b) would result in eliminating all con-
ventional notions of self (including the notions of subject, agent and the 
distinction between self and other). One way to avoid this implication 
might be to argue that the difference between (b) and an innocent, ac-
ceptable notion of conventional self lies not in a distinct sense of conven-
tional self but in a distinct attitude towards it (i.e., one of attachment or 
grasping). Thus, in removing (a) one removes (b) understood as the atti-
tude of attachment to or grasping at self rather than the conventional 
                                                                                                                     
 
verses 101–103 is a matter of scope (i.e., whether my concern should extend from my 
pain to include yours), with respect to which the specific details of the nature of pain is 
not relevant. 
70 See Williams (1999: 149). 
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notion of there being a self. Alternatively, it could be argued that since 
(b) is a form of (a), it has properties that are inconsistent with the broad-
er set of our conventional beliefs unlike an innocent, acceptable notion 
of conventional self as subject and agent.71 It would thus be open to an 
atypical Mādhyamika to reject conventional conceptions of self that are 
inconsistent with rational norms of consistency and coherence but retain 
those that are consistent.  
Finally, it would seem that much more would need to be said to 
explain how exactly a ‘meditational realization’ that we are empty of 
selves functions to transform various psychological attitudes and behav-
iour. The idea is intriguing; there does seem to be a substantive differ-
ence between believing something and understanding it and realizing its 
truth. However, further explanation is needed for how these distinct no-
tions are implicated by various forms of psychological attitudes and be-
havioural response. This might not be a problem if the claim is simply 
that an event of realization merely provides meditative assistance for the 
removal of selfishness and production of compassion. The need for ex-
planation becomes more pressing, however, if the claim is that it is a suf-
ficient cause of this transformation. 
 
  
                                               
 
71 See Westerhoff (2015). 
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Abbreviations 
BCA Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva 
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna   
PPMV Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti. of Candrakīrti  
PS  Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga 
PV Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti 
PVin Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti  
TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubandhu  
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